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Abstract Collective groundwater management by water
users—self-regulation—is increasingly advocated as a
complement to state regulation. This article analyzes the
attempts by the Guanajuato State Water Commission
(CEAG) in central Mexico to promote user self-regulation
through the establishment and development of 14 Con-
sejos Técnicos de Aguas (COTAS; Technical Water
Councils). Based on a joint assessment by a former senior
CEAG policy-maker and two researchers, Guanajuato’s
groundwater-management policy is reviewed to under-
stand why user self-regulation was less successful than
expected. It concludes that increasing awareness and
improving the knowledge base on groundwater is not
enough to trigger self-regulation by groundwater users. A
wider delegation of responsibilities to the COTAS is
necessary, combined with: (1) functioning mechanisms for
enforcing groundwater legislation, especially concerning
well permits and pumped volumes, and (2) mechanisms
that ensure the legitimacy and accountability of users’
representatives to both users and state agencies.
Keywords Groundwater management . User self-
regulation . Aquifer management councils . Guanajuato .
Mexico
Introduction
It is well established that very few examples of sustainable
groundwater management regimes exist in areas of
intensive groundwater use (Knegt and Vincent 2001;
Mukherji and Shah 2005; Shah 2005; Shah et al. 2007;
Birkenholtz 2009; Giordano 2009; Theesfeld 2010).
Hence, the collective management of groundwater by
water users—self-regulation—has increasingly been advo-
cated and studied as an alternative or a complement to
state regulation (Blomquist 1992; Lopez-Gunn 2003;
Steenbergen and Shah 2003; Custodio et al. 2005; Llamas
and Martínez-Santos 2005; Lopez-Gunn and Cortina
2006; Steenbergen 2006; Schlager 2007; Wester et al.
2009). This article analyzes one of the few examples from
around the world where user self-regulation has been
seriously attempted. In central Mexico, the Guanajuato
State Water Commission (Comisión Estatal del Agua de
Guanajuato, CEAG) has supported the establishment of
14 Consejos Técnicos de Aguas (COTAS; Technical Water
Councils, or aquifer management councils) since 1998, as
a complement to other measures to reduce groundwater
extraction. This was a unique effort, as surface and
groundwater in Mexico are national property and their
administration falls under federal jurisdiction. Although
the CEAG had no legal mandate regarding groundwater
abstractions and management, it felt compelled to create
the COTAS to counter, through user self-regulation, the
deplorable administration of groundwater in Guanajuato
(Guerrero 1998). The COTAS were conceived as local
water-management organizations consisting of all the well
owners of an aquifer (an estimated 13,500–16,500 well
owners in 14 aquifers) that would work together to
regulate groundwater extractions, and at a later stage to
stabilize aquifer groundwater levels. To achieve this
objective, CEAG developed an integrated groundwater-
management policy, consisting of increased stakeholder
participation, extensive groundwater-modeling studies,
programs to increase water-use efﬁciency, the creation of
a groundwater monitoring network, and communication
and capacity building efforts (Sandoval 2004).
Reaching sustainable groundwater extraction levels is
critical for Guanajuato (Scott and Shah 2004; Foster et al.
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2004; Wester et al. 2007). All its aquifers are over-
exploited, with annual extractions around 1,200 million
cubic meters (i.e. 1,200 hm3) above recharge (CEAG
2006). Total groundwater extractions ﬂuctuate around
4,100 hm3 while recharge is around 2,900 hm3 for the
whole state (CEAG 2006). This has led to a sustained
drop in groundwater levels over a period of 50 years of
around 2 m/year on average. Studies by CEAG indicate an
average drop in groundwater levels of 2.03 m/year
between 1995 to 2000 for all the aquifers in the state,
and up to 3.5 m/year near cities (CEAG 2001). Static
groundwater levels in 2004 varied from 28 to 175 m
below surface level in the north of the state, from 27 to
185 m in the center, from 30 to 140 m in the southwest,
and from 10 to 225 m in the southeast of the state
(Acevedo-Torres 2004). The areas where most of the
groundwater is extracted are the central Bajío region and
the Laguna Seca region in the northeast of the state (see
Fig. 1). The driving force behind groundwater depletion in
Guanajuato has been the large increase in groundwater
irrigation, from around 24,000 ha in 1960 to around
250,000 ha in the 1990s (Wester 2008). Although
irrigation accounts for some 83% of groundwater extrac-
tions in Guanajuato, groundwater is also critically impor-
tant for industrial and domestic water use: 99.3% of urban
and rural water supply is groundwater dependent while
industry exclusively uses groundwater (CEAG 2006).
Well before user self-regulation, other attempts were made
to regulate and reduce groundwater use in Guanajuato. Since
the 1950s, areas of intensive groundwater use in the state were
placed under a drilling ban (termed a veda in Mexico). With
this regulatory instrument, the federal government prohibited
the drilling of new wells in speciﬁed zones, unless a prior
pump permit was granted and the new well was intended to
replace an existing one. In the past 15 years, compulsory
pump registration, subsidies for irrigation modernization, and
the reform of electricity subsidies have been used by the
federal government to reduce groundwater use (Scott and
Shah 2004; Mukherji and Shah 2005; CEAG 2006; Wester et
al. 2009; Scott et al. 2010). Although the rate of increase in
groundwater abstractions has slowed since the 1990s, new
wells continue to be drilled and the water table continues to
decline unabated.
It was hoped in the late 1990s that user self-regulation
of groundwater extractions would prove to be the missing
piece in the groundwater management puzzle. Both the
federal government, through the National Water Commis-
sion (Comisión Nacional del Agua; CNA), and CEAG
promoted the implementation of participatory bodies to
move towards user self-regulation of groundwater use
(Marañón and Wester 2000; Maganda 2003: Scott and
Shah 2004; Wester et al. 2007). However, 10 years later it
appears that the COTAS initiative was not enough for
achieving sustained reductions in groundwater extractions
and inducing a shift towards improved governance of
groundwater resources by water users (Wester et al. 2009).
This raises questions about the enabling conditions that
are needed for effective user self-regulation and the design
of CEAG’s groundwater policy.
This article reassesses Guanajuato’s groundwater man-
agement policy of the past 10 years and the performance
of the COTAS. This reassessment is developed through a
self-critical dialogue between a former senior CEAG
policy-maker and two researchers who studied Guanajua-
Fig. 1 Areas of intensive groundwater use (grey) and major cities (black) in the State of Guanajuato, Mexico (Source: adapted from
Wester et al. 2009)
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to’s groundwater policies between 1998 and 2007.
Building on the perception that self-regulation has not
worked as expected, the dialogue juxtaposes the original
intentions and perceptions of the policy-maker and the
analysis of the researchers to arrive at a better under-
standing of the complexities of groundwater management.
Two main questions structure the dialogue: (1) Why did
CEAG’s groundwater policies have limited results in
addressing the central, self-deﬁned policy challenge of
reducing groundwater extractions leading to more sustain-
able aquifer management, and (2) what is needed for user
self-regulation to be a viable and achievable option for
reducing groundwater extractions?
Methodology
The material presented in this article is based on two
sources, the experiences of Ricardo Sandoval as a senior
CEAG ofﬁcial from 1998 to 2006, and research con-
ducted over a 10 year period by Philippus Wester and
from 2003 onwards by Jaime Hoogesteger on ground-
water management in Guanajuato. Intensive ﬁeldwork was
conducted in 1999, 2000 and 2003, supplemented with a
follow up study in 2006 and 2007. The research consisted
of interviews with CEAG and CNA ofﬁcials, COTAS
board members and managers and with water users,
participant observation at events organized by CEAG to
establish the COTAS in 1999 and 2000, and several
workshops with COTAS in 2000 and 2007 to discuss
research ﬁndings. Results were published in Marañón and
Wester (2000), Hoogesteger (2004), Sandoval (2004),
Wester (2008), Wester et al. (2008) and Wester et al.
(2009). Especially the material presented in this article in
the section Results strongly draws on and adapts the
material published in Wester et al. 2009.
The article was written based on an innovative
methodology, namely a critical and open dialogue
between a former public ofﬁcial responsible for Guana-
juato’s groundwater policy and two researchers. The
dialogue was nurtured by discussions over the years,
reading each others publications and writing this article
together. In this article, a retrospective approach has
been adopted in which the previous research ﬁndings
and perspectives of the researchers were juxtaposed
with the original perceptions and intentions of the
policy-maker and his understanding of the rationale
behind the policies that were implemented. Special
attention was paid to the roles, interests and reference
frameworks of groundwater users and other government
agencies in groundwater regulation, the institutional
setting, and the authors’ assumptions concerning each
actor’s expectations and reactions to the implemented
policies. The objective of this dialogue was to deepen
the understanding of what has impeded the achievement
of user self-regulation and a reduction in groundwater
abstractions. This article presents the outcomes of this
structured dialogue, indicating where a common under-
standing was reached by using the phrase “‘the authors’
shared perception is ….” and where different percep-
tions continue, with the phrase “it is the ‘researchers’ or
former policy-maker’s perception that ….”.
To present the outcomes of the dialogue, the form of a
historical narrative was chosen, instead of a conventional
analysis of policy impacts. First, there is a presentation of
the genesis of the COTAS from the mid to late 1990s in
Guanajuato and a reconstruction of the perceptions and
policy intentions underlying their establishment. Second,
the perceptions, understandings and restrictions that
inﬂuenced the formulation and implementation of Guana-
juato’s state water program from 2000 to 2006 are
analyzed, focusing on the groundwater component. Lastly,
the authors’ current understanding of the role of federal
and state government agencies and groundwater users in
the implementation of CEAG’s groundwater policy is
presented in the section Discussion.
Results
The genesis of the COTAS in Guanajuato from 1995
to 2000
The ﬁrst experiences with the creation of COTAS was in
Querétaro, a neighbor state to the east of Guanajuato,
where the CNA closely interacted with industrial users,
the city of Querétaro and farmers in developing an
aquifer-user committee in the early 1990s. This initiative
was based on the recognition that the old, top-down
regulatory approach of declaring vedas had not worked.
Through the establishment of COTAS, the CNA aimed to
stimulate the organized participation of aquifer users so
that agreements for reversing declines in groundwater
levels could be reached. However, as no speciﬁc mention
of COTAS was made in the National Waters Law of 1992,
there was much ambiguity about their characteristics,
mandate and structure. Between 1995 and 2000, the CNA
did not publish a policy document outlining the structure
and tasks of the COTAS or how they should be formed.
However, during this period it became clear that the CNA
intended the COTAS to be consultative bodies, without a
legal status or decision-making powers, in which aquifer
users, government water agencies and organized groups
from civil society would interact concerning groundwater
management, under the auspices of CNA.
It is the shared perception of the researchers and former
policy-maker that the CNA was very reluctant to design
aquifer management organizations with any real clout in
groundwater management. Several of the CNA ofﬁcials
actively involved with designing the COTAS in the mid
1990s have suggested that the COTAS were intended to
allow the federal government to reduce extractions by
means of voluntary agreements between water users—
which were meant to be set up using the ‘reglamentation’
procedure, according to the ﬁfth chapter of the National
Waters Law; this to bypass the expensive and legally
difﬁcult task of reducing the volumes of concessioned
groundwater rights to sustainable levels. When a conces-
sioned volume is to be reduced in Mexican law the term
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“rescate” (rescue) is used to refer to an administrative
procedure that enables the federal government to reduce
the concessioned volumes, with due compensation. This
can only be done after the federal government proves,
through studies, that aquifers are overexploited. In view
of this long legal process, consensual reductions seemed
to be a better approach although in the ﬁnal instance
these are not legally enforceable. In any case, the legal
validity of this assumption—that a regulation signed by
water users’ representatives (and not by every single
right-holder) would be enough to give the federal
government the capacity to limit existing titles without
compensation—is highly debatable.
While the CNA was setting up COTAS in Querétaro
and other parts of Mexico, in late 1996 Guanajuato’s
Secretaría de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Rural (SDAyR;
Secretariat of Agricultural and Rural Development) started
the formation of COTAS in the Celaya and Laguna Seca
aquifers. The CNA was not involved in this initiative,
which was a new development in Mexico, as until then the
CNA had been in ﬁrm control of water management
(Wester et al. 2009). The aim of this initiative was to
stimulate the participation of the aquifer users in reaching
a consensus on how to reduce groundwater extractions
(IMTA 1998). As there was no established procedure for
creating COTAS, and it was not clear what their attributes
would be, SDAyR embarked on an open-ended process to
form the COTAS. In SDAyR’s perspective, the formation
of the COTAS was to be a “bottom-up” process in which
the aquifer users would gain a clear understanding of the
gravity of groundwater depletion. Based on this under-
standing, they would collectively discuss ways to resolve
this problem. In contrast to the Querétaro COTAS, where
the CNAwas the president, SDAyR wanted the COTAS to
be more autonomous, with the users electing the repre-
sentatives and the president. After nearly a year of
deliberations, the two COTAS were formally constituted
on 28 November 1997.
In early 1998, the responsibility for the formation and
supervision of the COTAS within the Guanajuato state
government was transferred from SDAyR to the CEAG.
This “lateral transfer” from one state agency to another,
with preference being given to CEAG, occurred in the
context of the new federalism policy initiated during
President Zedillo’s administration (1994–2000), which
consisted of decentralizing government responsibilities,
programs and resources from the federal to the state level.
In the water sector, this entailed that State Water
Commissions would receive more responsibilities in water
management. The Comisión Estatal del Agua y Sanea-
miento de Guanajuato (Guanajuato State Water and
Sanitation Commission, CEASG) was created in 1991
by the state legislature to provide potable water, sewage
and sanitation services (in 2000 CEASG became the
“Comisión Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato”, hence this
article refers to CEAG throughout to be consistent). Until
1996, CEAG primarily functioned as a ﬁnancial mediator
between the federal government and municipalities,
mainly for domestic water supply projects, and was
largely bypassed by CNA in all other spheres of water
management. In 1996, the Guanajuato state government
decided to broaden CEAG’s mandate from municipal
water and sanitation to all aspects of water management,
turning it into the main water agency in the state. From
1996 to 1998, the organizational structure of the CEAG
was changed, to reﬂect its new mandate, and a large
number of water professionals were hired. However, it is
the researchers’ perception that CEAG continued to retain
a strong urban orientation, not just in terms of “organiza-
tional culture” and orientation, but as demonstrated in the
institutional arrangements for groundwater management,
which rested heavily on industrial, urban and commercial
farming users of groundwater (sharing many of these
urban “cultural orientations”) to the exclusion, or at least
diminished role, of ejidatario (peasant) agricultural water
users.
The move to CEAG led to several changes in the
structure of the COTAS. The most salient difference was
that CEAG decided to form Councils with only water-user
representatives on the COTAS board. In the CEAG model,
the membership of the COTAS was to consist of all the
water users of an aquifer, deﬁned as those extracting
groundwater for agricultural, industrial or commercial use,
while urban inhabitants would be represented through the
municipal water supply companies (Guerrero 2000). The
CEAG was quite clear that the COTAS should be a legally
recognized organization that would focus on regulating
and conserving water. Most importantly, the COTAS were
to reverse aquifer overexploitation and recover ground-
water levels by reaching agreements on aquifer manage-
ment and agreeing on actions to regulate, conserve and
efﬁciently use water (Guerrero 2000). To achieve these
goals it was foreseen that the COTAS would:
– Propose aquifer rules and regulations for the sustain-
able use of aquifers
– Propose a local hydraulic plan and participate in the
State Water Resources Plan
– Participate in the granting of water concessions
– Monitor the aquifer rules and regulations and the
volumes of water extracted
It is the authors’ shared perception that it was not the
intention of CEAG that the COTAS would become a
water agency with full user control over the aquifers,
although the model was partially inspired by the experi-
ence of the Edwards Aquifer Authority in Texas, USA. In
1998, a study trip to the Edwards Aquifer was organized
for the managers of the COTAS and the new “Social
Management Directorate” of the CEAG. However, CEAG
clearly did not have a consultative body in mind, which
was the model CNAwas pursuing. In the CNA model, the
COTAS were a mixed organization of government
agencies and user representatives focusing on ground-
water only, whose main task was to collaborate with, and
advise, the CNA in formulating the rules and regulations
of an aquifer. However, the COTAS would not participate
in decision-making or in granting water-use concessions.
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A ﬁnal important difference between the two models was
that CEAG intended the COTAS to be ﬁnancially and
administratively independent, and fully managed by water
users.
Besides changes in the structure and objectives of the
COTAS, the move to CEAG also changed their formation
process. The process followed by SDAyR was replaced by
a much quicker approach focused on showing results. By
the end of 1998, CEAG had constituted six COTAS in
addition to the two already formed in Celaya and Laguna
Seca. The remaining six were formed in 1999, bringing
the total number of COTAS in Guanajuato to fourteen, to
cover all 18 aquifers in the state (the COTAS boundaries
did not exactly follow aquifer boundaries). The COTAS
were formed as civil associations (a form of non-
governmental organizations speciﬁc to Mexican law), to
ensure that they were legally recognized. Nevertheless, as
civil associations they had no formal responsibilities or
legal mandate in water-management affairs; therefore,
they could work only as groupings of civil society that
were to function through their own agenda, mutual
agreements and the good will of their members.
CEAG deﬁned three phases for the establishment of
COTAS in Guanajuato: legal constitution, establishment of
aquifer regulations and organizational development. It
aimed to ﬁnish the ﬁrst two phases by the end of 2000, and
succeeded in completing the ﬁrst phase by the end of 1999.
The participation of aquifer users, especially farmers, in the
formation of the COTAS was restricted. CEAG did not opt
for a large-scale convocation of the users but only invited the
leaders of diverse organizations to participate in the
formation process of the COTAS. In the majority of cases,
the representatives of the agriculture sector in the COTAS
were commercial farmers or agroindustrialists and the
peasant sector (ejidos) was largely bypassed. Besides the
three agriculture representatives on the COTAS board, three
representatives each for the industrial, potable water, and
services sectors were selected. Thus, although agriculture
used around 80% of groundwater, it only had 25% weight in
the COTAS board.
This composition of the COTAS boards, intended by
CEAG to give each water-use sector an equal say without
regard for their actual economic, social or political
importance, did bring together all the water-use sectors,
but was to have a marked effect on their development. In
particular, the large industries, commercial farmers, and
municipal water companies veered the discussion of
overexploitation into one of water-use efﬁciency. Under
this rationale they all claimed that they were already
working on and using water very efﬁciently, and that it
was the agrarian producers, or small farmers, that were to
blame for groundwater overexploitation. Their rationale
could be phrased as follows: ‘if only all users would use
groundwater efﬁciently the problem of overexploitation
would be solved’. Through this rationale they bypassed
their own responsibility and difﬁcult task of establishing
agreements to downsize the groundwater volumes
extracted through the establishment of volume caps and
mutual control. However, if this leads to a reduction or
elimination of water ‘losses’ to deep percolation (which in
most aquifers of Guanajuato becomes recharge), without
reducing extracted volumes, this strategy only exacerbates
the overexploitation of aquifers.
CEAG chose ﬁrst to form the COTAS, and then to
expand user participation. It is the authors’ shared
perception that by neglecting to bring together the
majority of the aquifer users at the start to arrive at a
shared understanding of the problems facing the aquifer
and the possible solutions, CEAG failed to create a sense
of ownership among water users that the COTAS was
their organization. Later on, this proved to be an obstacle
for their consolidation. The lack of an adequate represen-
tation of all the groundwater users in the COTAS made it
difﬁcult to reach consensus on reductions in groundwater
extractions, and many users did not see the COTAS as
user organizations, but as an extension of the state
government. Thus, the approach followed in forming the
COTAS, namely sticking to timelines without giving
sufﬁcient space to reaching agreement between users,
restricted their effectiveness. However, through their
creation the CEAG created new domains of water
governance under its control. By late 1999, the whole
state of Guanajuato fell under COTAS which, under the
supervision of CEAG, would work to advance Integrated
Water Resources Management (IWRM) in their respective
aquifers. To the authors’ knowledge this is the ﬁrst time
that an IWRM approach based on aquifers as the spatial
unit, rather than river basins, was attempted in the world.
Although the COTAS were successfully created
between 1996 and 2000, their objective to reduce ground-
water overexploitation through user self-regulation did not
receive much attention. It is the researchers’ perception
that they formed part of a political and institutional project
of the state government to gain larger control over water
management in Guanajuato. The former policy maker’s
view is that while the COTAS project was part of a wider
strategy, in the beginning the aim of effectively monitor-
ing and controlling the extractions was clear and explicit;
the limitations were an output of the ineffective interaction
between CEAG and its counterparts, as well as the
imperfect understanding of the legal framework and the
failure in establishing a State Water Law enabling the
CEAG to set up a state water-administration structure. In
this, CEAG was only partly successful, as the CNA
remained in control of groundwater concessions, and
largely ignored the COTAS. Also, the move from SDAyR
to CEAG initially restricted the effectiveness of the
COTAS as many large commercial farmers lost interest,
as it was clear that the COTAS would not have any real
inﬂuence over groundwater extractions. Thus, the strug-
gles between levels of government and government
agencies signiﬁcantly reduced the prospects of the
COTAS reaching their goals.
The development of the COTAS from 2000 to 2006
In the period 2000–2006, when Vicente Fox, the former
governor of Guanajuato, was president of Mexico, the
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government of the state of Guanajuato decided to imple-
ment an ambitious program for water management. These
efforts were consolidated in the State Water Program
2000–2006, an update of the State Water Resources Plan.
This program had three main pillars: (1) understanding the
hydrogeology of the state, (2) investing in water-use
efﬁciency and supply augmentation and (3) increasing
user awareness and involvement in water management.
This ambitious program entailed several components to
ease the pressure on groundwater resources. Besides water
savings through irrigation modernization, two dams for
inter-basin water transfers were projected to import nearly
150 hm3 from the neighboring states of Jalisco and San
Luis Potosí, and a target was set to treat close to 90% of
the urban wastewater with the aim of establishing water-
exchange programs between farmers using groundwater
and cities (Sandoval 2004). This section describes how the
COTAS developed under this State Water Program
between 2000 and 2006.
The development of the 14 COTAS in Guanajuato
from 2000 to 2006 strongly depended on the continued
support of CEAG, who continued to pay for their
operational costs. The state budget for COTAS reached
nearly US$ 4 million, plus another 6 million for research,
groundwater modeling and monitoring (CEAG 2006, p.
49). CEAG’s efforts to strengthen the COTAS from 2000
to 2006 focused on increasing user participation and
formulating a groundwater management model. While the
original aim had been to formulate aquifer rules and
regulations by 2000, the focus on reducing groundwater
extractions moved to the background. Rather, the COTAS
were recast as “consensus-building spaces where inte-
grated water management models and programs are to be
implemented” (Sandoval 2004, pp 9–10). This new vision
was articulated by developing a “groundwater manage-
ment model” that built on the aquifer studies, mathemat-
ical models and different scenario modeling exercises
supervised and updated by CEAG.
CEAG, in coordination with the COTAS, developed
the groundwater management model in 2002, to focus on
concrete actions that would lead to signiﬁcant reductions
in groundwater extractions and foster social participation.
The ﬁrst two elements had already been developed
between 1998 and 2002, and consisted of the extensive
aquifer studies and the database developed by CEAG and
the COTAS on the number and location of groundwater
wells. A technical program was set up to make a
systematic assessment of the state’s aquifers, which
included the improvement of the inventory of deep wells,
the development of hydrogeological models for 14
aquifers and groundwater quality characterization (San-
doval 2004). During this process, the CEAG identiﬁed
more than 15,700 groundwater wells (many of which were
not registered by CNA), and this data was transferred to
the COTAS who further extended and updated the
groundwater wells database. This database contained
information on the position, depth, legal status, owner
and use of every well, and included other details such as
the presence of a volume meter, annual allocated water
volume by CNA, and, where possible, extracted volumes.
This information was regularly exchanged with CEAG
and was made available to the users at the ofﬁces of the
COTAS and through presentations at workshops; but the
users had little interest for this database. The third element
consisted of the monitoring of groundwater levels.
Starting in 1998, CEAG set up a groundwater monitoring
network that grew to 12 deep observation wells and 955
pilot wells, for which the COTAS collect the static level
readings twice a year. Based on the aquifer studies, cones
of depression were identiﬁed in the aquifers and one pilot
zone per COTAS covering between 50 to 100 km2 and
100 to 300 users was established in 13 COTAS while
seven pilot zones were established in the Celaya COTAS.
Based on the wells database, the COTAS identiﬁed the
groundwater users in the pilot zones, and initiated an
intensive process of working with the users to identify and
reach agreements on a list of measures to reduce ground-
water extractions (Montoya et al. 2004). This program
mainly focused on agriculture, and sought to channel the
various government support programs for irrigation
modernization through the COTAS to these pilot zones.
The intention was to produce the same or more crops with
less water and energy, hence at a lower cost. Once the
measures had been agreed on and funded, the users were
requested to form aquifer monitoring committees, to
monitor groundwater levels within the pilot zones and
evaluate the results of the interventions. They were urged
to install meters on their pumps and to carefully monitor
pumping hours and electricity use. The long-term objec-
tive was that the pilot zones would gradually be expanded,
to cover the whole aquifer. Only then would the work start
on drawing up the rules and regulations of the aquifers, as
CEAG believed that groundwater users would only
support and implement the regulations after investments
had been made in social participation and water-use
efﬁciency.
As a result of the groundwater management model, the
number of users that became members of the COTAS rose
from 225 in 2000 to 8,610 in 2006 (of an estimated
13,500–16,500 well owners), and 20 aquifer monitoring
committees were formed (CEAG 2006). The COTAS
together with government agencies trained around 5,300
users in water issues, including basic hydrology and the
groundwater situation in Guanajuato and the speciﬁc
aquifers, legal water-use issues, water-use efﬁciency in
agriculture and the use of sprinkler and drip irrigation
systems. In addition, extensive information campaigns on
a “new water culture” were held in schools and at fairs.
Another important achievement of the COTAS is that each
has updated and veriﬁed the database on groundwater
wells, in the process identifying many irregular wells.
Lastly, for many farmers the COTAS have become an
important service window that supports them in their
interactions with government agencies. Especially con-
cerning groundwater concession titles, the COTAS play an
important role as intermediary between farmers and the
CNA and other state and federal agencies, both for
obtaining and renewing the titles (most titles are valid
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for ten years). The COTAS have also become intermedia-
ries for users wishing to modernize their irrigation
systems, and many farmers would like to see this role
expanded.
Based on the strong support from CEAG the COTAS
matured between 2000 and 2006, and their position and
tasks became clearer. They established themselves in most
aquifers as platform organizations where water users from
different sectors exchanged ideas and set up initiatives for
water-management projects within hydrological bounda-
ries. The aquifer monitoring committees led to raised
awareness. At a political level the COTAS gained the
recognition of the CNA and the 2004 revision to the
National Waters Law included an article on COTAS, yet
their attributions remain marginal and have been described
as supportive to the CNA. Based on these provisions,
CNA delegated several programs to the COTAS and gave
them a role in supporting the users in the administrative
procedures required for the renovation of groundwater-use
permits. However, they did not become full-ﬂedged user
organizations in which strategies for reducing ground-
water overexploitation were devised. As a result, their
contribution to achieving signiﬁcant reductions in ground-
water extractions was limited.
During interviews in 2006 and 2007, COTAS board
members and CEAG ofﬁcials frequently mentioned that
for the COTAS to have an impact they need to have more
responsibilities and delegated authority. Many of the
groundwater actors in Guanajuato, especially COTAS
board members and CEAG ofﬁcials, want to convert the
COTAS into groundwater management districts with
delegated responsibilities to regulate groundwater extrac-
tions. In this model, the groundwater districts would
receive the delegated authority to advise on and approve
the granting of groundwater concessions in collaboration
with the CNA, while holding the legal capacity to ﬁne
pumpers extracting more than their concessioned volume
and to close illegal wells. To fund the COTAS, ground-
water users would have to pay an annual fee based on the
volume extracted. To make this possible, the mandate of
the COTAS would need to be expanded, so that they
would share the responsibility for the registration and
regularization of wells, the formulation and enforcement
of aquifer rules and regulations and the monitoring of
groundwater extractions together with the CNA and
CEAG. This would also require a formal mandate from
the water users holding a groundwater concession title. At
present, the COTAS are already involved in these three
areas, but they do not have the capacity or legal mandate
to arrive at and enforce decisions. Whether the COTAS
will become groundwater districts with delegated respon-
sibilities will strongly depend on CNA’s willingness to
share this water governance domain with groundwater
users and on CEAG’s support for reaching that goal. The
experiences of the past 10 years in this regard are not
hopeful. Neither is the legal framework, which does not
foresee the delegation of CNA’s responsibilities over the
administration of water-use permits to other levels of
government, or outside of it.
Discussion
The results of the dialogue show that the challenges posed
by groundwater overexploitation in Guanajuato have
precluded achieving signiﬁcant results in terms of user
self-regulation over the past 10 years. The high hopes
placed in the COTAS as an innovative approach to
groundwater management have proven to be too optimis-
tic, as they have not yet achieved sustained reductions in
groundwater extractions as aquifer water levels have
continued to decline unabated and total extracted volumes
have increased, according to CEAG studies, from around
4,000 hm3 in 2001 to 4,100 hm3 in 2006 (CEAG 2001,
2006). However, CEAG’s groundwater policy has led to a
much better understanding of the extent of groundwater
overexploitation based on the hydrodynamic groundwater
modeling studies it funded. Its policy has also strength-
ened user participation in the COTAS, which in 2010 has
reached 43% of the registered water users (CEAG 2010),
and increased public awareness of groundwater over-
exploitation. Why CEAG’s groundwater policy was less
successful than hoped for in terms of achieving user
self-regulation is discussed in this section, based on the
authors’ understanding of the original assumptions and
expectations underlying the policy and the authors’
current perceptions of the challenges posed by ground-
water overexploitation. To assess the effectiveness of
the COTAS, their development is discussed in relation
to the evolution of the institutional environment and the
other actions taken by CEAG to improve groundwater
management.
It is the authors’ shared perception that CEAG’s overall
approach to groundwater regulation appears to have been
insensitive to the inﬂuence of the economic and social
drivers of groundwater overexploitation. From its unpub-
lished hydroeconomic models it became evident that
energy subsidies were detrimental to groundwater con-
servation, as has been shown for many other cases around
the world (Scott and Shah 2004; Shah et al. 2007). Based
on the former policy-maker’s knowledge of the outcomes
of the hydroeconomic models, even under the most
optimistic scenarios, only a 20–25% reduction in the
volume of overexploitation could be achieved without
compulsory well closures. Within the assumptions and the
limits of the models, a compulsory reduction in the
number of wells seemed to be necessary for effectively
balancing the aquifer, a delicate issue that was never
analyzed with the users.
The signiﬁcant support of the CEAG for the establish-
ment and development of the COTAS was originally
based on the assumption that organizing aquifer users and
raising their awareness of groundwater overexploitation
was both a necessary condition for, and would relatively
easily lead to, reaching agreements between users on
reductions in groundwater abstractions. This would
simultaneously improve the enforcement of groundwater
legislation. Through the dialogue it has become clear that
CEAG’s groundwater policy was based on a “rationalist
policy” perspective and that it followed a “social engineer-
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ing” approach in the late 1990s. Informed by neo-
institutionalist ideas on common property management
(Ostrom 1992), CEAG assumed that the problem was that
groundwater users were not sufﬁciently aware of the
damage they were causing to their aquifers and that if well
informed, users would be motivated and able to collec-
tively deﬁne mechanisms and agreements to reduce
groundwater use. The state through the CEAG had only to
create the right environment and provide the correct
information, while supporting the CNA to increase its
measures for regularizing the groundwater concession titles
and identifying illegal wells. Therefore CEAG invested in
mathematical aquifer studies and established monitoring
networks in all the aquifers to provide the users with reliable
and validated information. It was CEAG’s intention that
aquifer users themselves would then deﬁne the most suitable
ways to reduce extractions based on this information. For
this, it also established a training and awareness raising
campaign. Although very valuable and necessary, the
expected outcomes of these efforts ran aground on the
rationality of the groundwater users.
The rationale of farmers did not match the expectations
and underlying assumptions of CEAG’s groundwater
policy. The policy assumed that aquifer users would be
willing to participate in decision making for solving the
problem of declining groundwater levels if they received
proper information and budgetary support for investing in
efﬁcient water use. Nevertheless only a very small
percentage of the users (3-10%) became involved in the
creation of the COTAS (Marañón and Wester 2000). This
reluctance to participate was expressed by the following
phrase of a farmer “we are not groundwater managers, we
are agricultural producers; water management is the
responsibility of the state”. Besides, most farmers were
skeptical about the idea and feared losing their freedom
over groundwater pumping and control (Hoogesteger
2004). There was little demand for COTAS by ground-
water users, in particular by cities, industries and the large
commercial farmers; and their rapid formation precluded
the development of active user participation. Also, the
lack of coordination with the SDAyR, whose programs for
funding efﬁcient water-use technologies were initially
implemented disregarding the plans, models and proposals
from the COTAS, contributed to a reduced interest of the
agricultural sector in the COTAS. The aquifer users that
became actively involved in the COTAS did so because of
a conviction that “something” had to be done. The
industrial and drinking-water supply sectors mostly
blamed the agricultural sector for groundwater over-
exploitation and argued that even if they substantially
reduced their groundwater extractions this would have a
very minor impact on groundwater levels as agricultural
use makes up more than 80% of overall extractions. As for
the farmers that joined the COTAS, just as for most
farmers, their most pressing problems are the proﬁtability
of agricultural production and more recently the renewal
of the groundwater pumping permits; a situation which is
not very conducive to ﬁnding strategies to reduce ground-
water use.
A stronger detriment to user self-regulation was the
institutional environment and legal framework concerning
groundwater. As surface and groundwater in Mexico are
national property for which the federal government is
responsible, the attempt by a state government to take on a
larger role in water management was bound to lead to
frictions and struggles between levels of government.
However, frustration with the lack of action by the CNA to
reverse aquifer overexploitation and the slack enforcement of
federal groundwater legislation strongly motivated CEAG to
take the lead in establishing COTAS in Guanajuato. The
original assumption underlying CEAG’s efforts to create
COTAS was that CNA’s approach to COTAS was bound to
fail as it was creating advisory bodies under its control
instead of user organizations. CEAG’s perception in 1998
was that the CNAwas forming COTAS to reach consensual
agreements on reducing groundwater abstractions so that it
would not have to force users to reduce abstractions by
buying back groundwater concessions, a legally, politically
and ﬁnancially difﬁcult process. CEAG’s original intention
was to create user organizations that would become fully
responsible for managing their aquifers and it believed it
could do a better job than the CNA. In the 1996–2000 period,
the struggles between the federal and state government
signiﬁcantly hindered the efforts to form autonomous and
effective COTAS. This changed somewhat in the 2000–2006
period, but even then, CEAG’s models and pilot zones were
never recognized by the CNA as a part of its groundwater
management strategy. Nevertheless, the COTAS did become
more independent in this period, especially with regards to
CEAG’s policies and programs. This made their relationship
more complex, leading to more discussions and longer
negotiations on the planning and implementation of the
yearly programs supported by the CEAG.
In terms of governance, it is the authors’ shared
perception that it is society as a whole—including “future
generations”—that delegates to government the task of
safeguarding against aquifer depletion and preserving the
waters for all and for the future. The suggested hypothesis
is that the institutional environment, mainly the way
attributions and jurisdiction over water are distributed,
creates a legal system which puts the onus for enforce-
ment and compliance on the CNA. This makes it prone to
becoming a hostage of regulatory capture, since there are
no checks and balances in place that enable society to
control the federal government, which plays the role of
both judge and jury. Nevertheless in the past 10 years, ﬁrst
the CEAG and later the COTAS have challenged this
hegemonic power of the CNA. The existence of the
COTAS and the efforts of Guanajuato’s government have
pushed the federal government to open up to delegation
and cooperation mechanisms, unthinkable even just a
decade ago.
Conclusions
Many attempts have been made in Guanajuato to regulate
and reduce groundwater use, including user self-regulation
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and state regulation through pumping bans (vedas),
pumping permits and the reduction of electricity subsidies.
To date, these efforts have not led to signiﬁcant reductions
in groundwater extractions, urgently needed to stabilize
aquifer water levels. However, CEAG’s groundwater
policy should not be judged too harshly. Research from
around the world has shown that it is very difﬁcult to
organize aquifer users and to develop social control over
groundwater pumping (cf. Blomquist 1992; Shah et al.
2003; Steenbergen and Shah 2003; Milman and Scott
2010). The “invisible” character of groundwater makes it
difﬁcult to determine who is pumping how much and to
monitor reductions in extractions. In addition, ground-
water is extracted by widely dispersed and numerous
pumps controlled by many individuals, who have a strong
incentive to maximize groundwater withdrawals to
recover high capital investments. Worldwide experience
shows that permit systems to regulate groundwater use are
very prone to corruption and that establishing groundwater
rights is even more difﬁcult than for surface water
(Steenbergen and Shah 2003; Fornés et al. 2005; Llamas
and Martínez-Santos 2005; Garrido et al. 2006; Schlager
2006; Shah 2009). In contrast to surface irrigation
systems, where water users must collaborate to ensure
water deliveries, pumpers operate relatively independently
from each other. It is only after prolonged periods of
pumping that their combined actions result in groundwater
overexploitation and the need for aquifer governance
becomes germane. However, even if a strong aquifer
governance structure is constituted and reductions in
groundwater extractions are agreed on, it takes a long
time before an aquifer stabilizes and the pumpers see any
reward for their restraint. Hence, the incentive for aquifer
users to collaborate is limited, which complicates the self-
regulation of aquifers by groundwater users.
A former president of the Silao COTAS remarked that
water users could never solve the groundwater situation
by themselves, but that the authorities would never be able
do it either without the users. This sounds positive and
logical, but it forewarns of the inescapable presence, from
that moment on, of the aquifer management councils as an
actor (agent) with a say in a system that is not working to
reduce groundwater extractions. Setting up a participatory
institutional arrangement without showing parallel pro-
gress in building credible incentives for self-regulation by
improving law enforcement, increasing governmental
coordination, and developing consistent ﬁnancial support
mechanisms, can lead to additional problems. Promoting
user self-regulation without an enabling environment may
actually worsen the problem by contributing to the
emergence of a new institutional arrangement in which
the COTAS do not have the means to contribute to
effective groundwater management, while in a way
validating the present institutional arrangement.
A fuller delegation of responsibilities to the COTAS
appears necessary for them to be effective. In cases where
user self-regulation is more advanced, such as in Cal-
ifornia (Blomquist 1992), the Edwards aquifer in Texas
(Donahue 1998; Votteler 2002) and in Spain (Lopez-Gunn
2003; Lopez-Gunn and Cortina 2006), a stronger mandate
for groundwater user organizations was a crucial ingre-
dient. In the case of Guanajuato, this would require checks
and balances at different levels in order to avoid the
creation of new centers of power with no accountability to
their constituents or to the state and federal governmental
agencies. In order for the COTAS to be effective, the
control mechanisms need to be transparent and open to the
public. This increase in the COTAS’ responsibilities
should go hand in hand with an increase in their human,
material and ﬁnancial resources, to enable them to manage
and control groundwater use.
Institutional coordination of efforts to reduce ground-
water use should receive the highest priority and should be
integrated into a policy package which bundles the
different efforts that are being undertaken by CEAG,
CNA, SDAyR and CFE (the Federal Electricity Commis-
sion). Coupling groundwater control with energy con-
sumption would give COTAS, CEAG and CNA a strong
control measure. Direct control over pumped volumes is
very hard to monitor because of the ease of tampering
with volumetric meters. At present CFE, which is almost
the exclusive provider of energy for running the pumps,
has a detailed database of consumed energy as users are
charged volumetrically for the electricity they consume. If
this information gets coupled to groundwater depths and
electro-mechanical efﬁciencies of pumps, energy con-
sumption could be used as a control measure for extracted
volumes. If such information would become open to the
public and to the involved institutions, users could install
transparent mutual-control mechanisms.
To further develop COTAS into viable organizations of
groundwater users that enable user self-regulation of
groundwater extractions, a careful system of checks and
balances needs to be developed to ensure accountability,
legitimacy and transparency. The COTAS could then
become ‘social auditors’ of the CNA, while helping
authorities to perform water administration activities not
linked to ‘acts of authority’ (reserved by law to public
ofﬁcers), based on a clear distribution of roles, means and
goals. The water authority would not have to watch and
punish every single act of illegality, but would have to
respond effectively to the cases reported by the COTAS,
thereby building a credible incentive for self-regulation.
To move forward, groundwater users would need to
devise aquifer agreements with substantially lower levels
of groundwater extractions, either through an adjudication
of pumping rights on the basis of mutual prescription
(Blomquist 1992) or through a negotiated downward
adjustment of groundwater concessions with the federal
government. However, this would require far-reaching
institutional changes. First, functioning mechanisms for
enforcing groundwater legislation, especially concerning
well permits and pumped volumes, are needed to create
credible incentives for groundwater users to engage in
self-regulation. Second, mechanisms are needed to ensure
the legitimacy and accountability of users’ representatives
to both users and state agencies. It is the authors’ shared
perception that based on the experience of the past
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12 years with user self-regulation of groundwater extrac-
tions in Guanajuato, it will prove difﬁcult but not
impossible to realize these recommendations.
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